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Environmental Law and Growing Up
David Schoenbrodt
Typical of many Yale law students of the late 1960s, I wanted
to lead the way to "progressive" social goals. My friends and I
had learned from Professor Guido Calabresi that reaching these
goals required making difficult choices such as between preventing
accidents and keeping down the cost of their prevention,' or,
more to the present point, between protecting the environment
and keeping down the cost of its protection. We also knew who
ought to make these choices for society-us.
We wanted power to change the world and thought little about
its legitimacy. We were impatient with professors, such as
Alexander Bickel and Robert Bork, who questioned the legitimacy
of judicial policymaking and who argued that those who disagree
with political decisions should resort to political, not judicial
procedures.2 For us, their procedural concerns were excuses to
oppose progress: our goals justified the means. To gain such
power, I joined some law school friends who had founded the
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). We saw ourselves as
"private attorneys general"-able to wield the governmental power
that political officials failed, in our opinion, to use properly.
Litigation gave us real power, at least initially. It was a heady
thing, at barely thirty years of age, to be litigating cases that had
a major impact on the shape of environmental law and also
sometimes forced industries to spend billions of dollars, frustrated
t Professor of Law, New York University; BA, Yale University, 1963; B. Phil.,
Oxford University, 1965; L.L.B., Yale University, 1968.
1. See generally G. CumREss & P. BosBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978); G. CA.ABREsi, TILE
COSTS OF A iorXErs: A LEGAL AND FcoNoMic ANAusLs (1970).
2. These views were reflected in their writings. See, e.g., A. BICXZL, ThE LEsT
DANGERous BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF PounCs (1986); Bork, Neutral Princi-
ples and Soe First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
3. NRDC's founding members were from two distinct groups. The first group
consisted of Yale law graduates who were interested in creating a nonprofit public interest
law firm. The second group was comprised of New York "establishment* lawyers and
conservationists who were opposed to the construction of a pumped-storage power plant
at Storm King Mountain on the Hudson River. Both groups sought funding from the Ford
Foundation which suggested that they combine their efforts. The groups adopted the Ford
Foundation suggestion and NRDC was incorporated in December, 1969. See Adams,
Responsible Militancy-The Anatomy of a Public Interest Law Firm, 29 Rxc. A.B. Crrv N.Y. 631,
633 (1974).
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cabinet-level decisions, or were covered on network news.' NRDC
was able to exercise substantial power at this time because public
demand for environmental protection had reached a fever pitch
just when public confidence in government had waned. The war
in Vietnam and the machinations of Presidents Johnson and
Nixon critically damaged the public's confidence in government.
This distrust of government gave rise to legislation which
transformed legal institutions in ways that enabled us to become
private attorneys general.
We obtained what we thought we needed to achieve our goals,
but we failed to foresee the pitfalls lurking in the newly modified
legal institutions that provided us with that power. These
institutions were too good to be true, but I was too young and
hopeful to know that. Part I of this comment uses the history of
air pollution control to describe the changes that occurred in
legal institutions. Part II argues that in establishing the current
legal institutions-through the passage of the 1970 Amendments
to the Clean Air Act-Congress played the demagogue rather
than honorably discharging its responsibilities to make difficult
choices. This Comment concludes with a discussion of how these
changes in legal institutions affected the role of public interest
lawyers.
I. Changing Legal Institutions
Changes in the law concerning air pollution provide a stark
example of the transformation of legal institutions in which public
interest lawyers gained new power. The common law treated air
pollution as a nuisance.' The measure of acceptable nuisance was
custom, and custom balanced the desire for clean air against the
need to emit pollution for almost any industrial or even domestic
activity However, since the common law could not handle many
4. See, e.g., Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d
1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (development of fast breeder nuclear reactors requires programmatic
environmental impact statement); NRDC v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Clean Air
Act requires plans to control land use and transportation); NRDC v. EPA, No. 72-2233
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 28. 1973) (EPA must decide whether to regulate lead in gasoline).
5. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1982)).
6. See RSTK'AFEMENr (SECOND) OF ToaTs § 821A (1979); Paossza & KErON, TuE LAW OF
ToaTS § 86 (1984).
7. See W. RODGERS JL., FNVIRONMErAL. LAw AIR AND WATER 47-48 (1986).
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air pollution conflicts,' legislatures responded by enacting specific
rules of conduct.' Like the common law, these legislated rules
reflected a balance, albeit struck on a political scale, between the
concerns of both polluter and victim.
Legislatures began to delegate substantial rulemaking authority
to administrative agencies. This shift away from legislative
rulemaking was most dramatic during the 1930s. At that time,
many scholars questioned the public's ability to elect legislatures
on a well-informed, rational basis without being unduly influenced
by special interests, like the polluting industries." The public
interest would seemingly get a fairer shake in a nonpolitical
arena, such as an expert administrative agency. Therefore, when
air pollution became a federal concern in the early 1960s, it
seemed natural for Congress to give federal agencies and the
states broad discretion to design the rules of conduct." Such
legislation, in essence, gave federal administrators and state
officials the power to balance the interests of polluters and the
victims of pollution as other institutions had balanced them in
previous legal regimes.
Administrative agencies and states operating under broad
statutory delegations gradually began to promulgate rules to
reduce air pollution. These steps, however, were too little, too
late to calm mounting public anxiety over pollution." As Ralph
Nader wrote, "The deep loss of popular belief that government
is capable of protecting and advancing the public interest against
this airborne epidemic and its corporate sources reflects a broader
absence of confidence."'" There was widespread distrust of
administrative agencies, which had turned out to be not quite so
8. See generally R. Sraw~Ar & J. KumFa, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND PoucV 198-324 (1978)
(common law rules failed because of lack of applicable custom or high transactions costs).
9. These statutes go back centuries. For example. Edward I enacted a smoke abate-
ment law as early as 1273. See Chass & Feldman, Tears for John Doe., 27 S. CAL. L. R~v. 349,
352 (1954).
10. See generally E. PuRsE., TILE Cusms oW DFuoCaRATc TiiORv: SaETrfiC NAru mism
AND nz PRoBuM op VALUE 95-114 (1973) (academic scholarship of 1920s and 1930s argued
that electorate could not deal with public issues wisely).
11. See Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30
U.C.L.A. L lav. 740, 744-45 (1983).
12. Id.
13. See Rm.LP NADER STUDY GROUP REPORT ON An POLLTIrrON, VANISHING A vii (1970)
(foreword by Ralph Nader) (hereinafter NADER RFPor).
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expert, highly political, and vulnerable to lobbying from regulated
industries. 4
Public distrust of agencies put heat on Congress to make the
hard choices.' 5 Ralph Nader pinned the blame on Senator Muskie
who could not ignore the criticism because he had based his
presidential ambitions partly on his image as a guardian of the
environment.' 6 Congress responded to demands that it make the
hard choices by passing the Clean Air Act of 1970. Senator
Muskie, one of the major architects of the legislation, promised
that it would mean that "all Americans in all parts of the country
shall have clean air to breathe within the 1970s."'' 7 He claimed
that, instead of passing the buck, the Act that he authored had
made the "hard choices."'" The choices that Congress claimed it
made in 1970 to fulfill its promise of healthy air 9 included a
mandate that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) "shall"
decide how clean the air needs to be to protect health by setting
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)," that to meet
this goal by 1977 the states "shall" adopt plans that place the
necessary limits on emissions of air pollution,"' and that, should
a state fail to adopt such a plan, EPA "shall" impose one on that
state. If any "shall" goes undone, or if any source violates an
emission limit, then at the behest of any citizen a federal district
judge "shall" require compliance with the Act.23 Congress enacted
this statute unanimously2 4 partly because it promised healthy air
without forcing legislators to decide an issue that had no popular
14. See Ackerman & Hassler. Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 Y~A
L.J. 1466, 1474-79 (1980) (discussing perception that New Deal paradigm had not worked
as intended and was inadequate to deal with air pollution problem).
15. See generally Elliot, Ackerman & Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985) (describing the political
origins of federal environmental legislation).
16. See NADERt RE.POwr, supra note 13.
17. 116 CoNo. RFc. 42,381 (1970).
18. Id.
19. For a detailed discussion, see Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 756-62.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1982).
21. Id. §§ 7410(a),(c) (1982). See generally Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 756-59.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (1982).
23. Id. § 7604 (1982).
24. The House of Representatives approved H.R. 17255 on June 10, 1970, by a vote
of 375 to 1. 116 CONr. RF£c. 19,244 (1970). The Senate passed H.R. 17255 with a Senate
amendment on September 17, 1970, by a vote of 73 to 0. 116 CONG. REc. 32,371 (1970).
The Conference Report was approved on December 18, 1970 by a unanimous vote both
in the House, 116 CONG. REc. 42,524 (1970), and in the Senate, 116 CONG. Rsc. 42,395
(1970).
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solution: how to allocate the costly burden of reducing emis-
sions."5 Instead, Congress chose to delegate this issue. In contrast,
in dealing with automobiles, Congress did make the difficult
choices in setting emission limits on new cars,' 6 but it delegated
the decision on emission limits for stationary sources."
II. The Clean Air Act as a Fraud
Putting the automobile emission limits aside, the 1970 Amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act (Act) worked like a chain letter:"8 the
public paid the authors of the Act political tribute for its passage,
but the public was left waiting for a payoff promised to come
from those lower down the chain of delegation." EPA did
establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards for some air
pollutants0 and most states did begin to adopt cleanup plans for
some pollutants. 1 But states balked as they began to realize that
promulgation of emission limits sufficient to meet federal health
standards meant higher electricity rates, layoffs in some sectors,
a price advantage for imports, and controls on the voters' use of
their cars. 2 The states' refusal to adopt plans put the legal onus
on EPA to impose plans on the states with air pollution controls
adequate to achieve its National Ambient Air Quality Standards. 3
During the early 1970s, this statutory scheme helped public
interest environmental litigation groups such as NRDC win in
courtrooms. 4 The citizen suit provision of the Act33 allowed
private attorneys general to sue EPA for failure to perform any
of its mandatory duties to protect public health by implementing
sufficient emission controls on industry and to sue industry for
failure to obey these emission controls. There were bound to be
25. See Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 765-66.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b) (1982).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412, 7545 (1982).
28. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1982)).
29. See Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 766-77.
30. National Primary and Secondary Air Quality Standards, 36 Fed. Reg. 8186, 8187
(1971) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (1972)).
31. See Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 763, 777.
32. Id. at 770-71.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (1982).
34. See, e.g., NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976) (EPA required to list lead
as pollutant requiring NAAQS).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982).
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many implementation failures"8 because the Act, unlike the
common law and earlier statutes, made no allowance for balancing
health protection against other concerns, even though such
balancing is inevitable." The 1970 Act failed to grapple with the
reality that balancing would be just as inevitable after 1977 as it
was before.
Indeed there were far more opportunities for winning law suits
than NRDC could possibly bring. We had the prerogative to
decide what suits to bring, and thereby to determine, in part,
how EPA, state, and industry resources would be deployed to
address the pollution problem. In my opinion, NRDC helped to
advance the social goals which we considered important. What
concerns me now is not how NRDC played its role, but the
efficacy and legitimacy of the legal institutions in which its role
was played.
A. Delegation: A Poor Means to a Worthwhile End
Congressional delegation was probably not the most effective
way to achieve the goal of a cleaner environment. Although early
advocates of delegation thought agencies were insulated from the
political fray, subsequent experience showed that Congress and
the White House had real power to influence how EPA exercised
its delegated authority. 8 Bowing to that pressure, EPA learned
how to play the game in a way that made the going much
tougher for public interest groups that were trying to enforce the
statutory mandate. EPA could avoid difficult decisions for several
years just by drawing out the process of litigation."9 When courts
36. See Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 766-77 (catalog of breakdowns in EPA's
implementation of Clean Air Act).
37. Under the 1970 Act, economic and technological feasibility do not excuse harm
to health except in the transitory sense that a limited amount of time is allowed to perform
each of the mandatory duties on the road to complete health protection. See, e.g., Train v.
NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 64-67 (1975).
38. For example, the White House can fire EPA's leaders, while Congress can cut its
budget and harass its officials through hearings, subpoenas, investigations, and letters of
inquiry. These pressures make it difficult for an aggressive EPA to impose tough plans on
states and industry. See Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 769-75; IASH, SEASON OF SPoiLs (1984)
(chronicling White House interference with EPA and Department of Interior in early
Reagan years.)
39. The NRDC complaint designed to force EPA to promulgate ambient air standards
for lead was filed on March 2, 1974. See NRDC v. Train, 411 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y.
1976). The court of appeals upheld the order compelling EPA to establish a standard for
lead in 1976. See NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2nd Cir. 1976). EPA's ambient air
standard for lead was finally approved on appeal. See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d
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finally did order the Agency to act, EPA tried to avoid imposing
controversial emission limits by approving state plans that it knew
were insufficient to meet health goals,"0 tampering with the goals
to make them less stringent," and failing to establish any National
Ambient Air Quality Standards for some pollutants known to be
dangerous." Showing a reviewing court that EPA had doctored its
numbers, was much tougher than proving that EPA had missed
a deadline.41
Throughout this period, the same legislators that had reaped
political credit, sometimes with our help, for protecting the
environment by enacting the legislation, were urging EPA to go
easy and thus getting more political credit and campaign
contributions from constituents threatened with emission controls.
For example, the New York City congressional delegation, which
generally prides itself on its environmental sensitivity, was quick
to oppose environmental regulations that would cost their constit-
uents. In Friends of the Earth v. Carey," NRDC obtained a court
order against the Governor of New York State and the Mayor of
New York City to force them to implement a plan that placed
tolls on the Harlem and East River Bridges to raise funds to
improve mass transit as an alternative to the automobile. 5 The
entire city congressional delegation called for an amendment to
the Act in order to circumvent a possible court order, with two
interesting exceptions. Congressman Ted Weiss, who had
relatively few drivers and many transit riders in his district, stood
by NRDC, and Congressman Jonathan Bingham called for tolls on
bridges except those that came into his district.'6 In another
example, Senator Thomas Eagleton, who played a prominent role
in the passage of the 1970 Clean Air Act, put pressure on the
1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980). cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).
40. See Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 771-74.
41. See id. at 776.
42. See, e.g., Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 776-79.
43. See, e.g., Mission Indus. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123, 128 (1st Cir. 1976) (affirming EPXs
approval of plan although EPA conceded possible random error as high as 150% for annual
average of pollutant emissions and 200% for short-term concentrations).
As one commentator remarked in NRDC's magazine: "The deadlines suits have chas-
tened the agencies but they haven't really helped set priorities or dean up the envi-
ronment." Turner, The Legal Eagles. Amicus J., Winter, 1988, at 25, 28 (quoting Ed Frost,
former general counsel of Chemical Manufacturers Association)
44. 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976).
45. Id.
46. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1977, at 30, col. 3.
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EPA Administrator to take account of the economic importance of
the lead industry to his state when it set the standard for lead.47
What enabled legislators to be all things to all interests was
the enactment of legislation that delegated the essential legislative
task of making rules of conduct-the emission limitations-and to
save for itself the task of establishing goals and rules of proce-
dure. Setting goals is attractive to legislators because they need
only set the popular ones. Making rules of procedure is also
desirable because the procedure obscures the failure to make
tough choices.
When the 1977 deadline for achieving the ambient standards
drew near, Congress did not change the fundamentals of its
convenient legislative scheme. Instead, it enacted amendments that
postponed the deadline to 1982 for some pollutants and 1987 for
others.4 8 Congress also stopped EPA from imposing some
unpopular emission controls on automobiles and politically potent
industries without saying what other controls EPA should impose
to meet the health goals.
4 9
The 1977 amendments to the Act have worked much like the
original 1970 legislation. Neither the 1982 nor 1987 deadlines
have been achieved. Since 1980, Congress has worked on
amending the 1977 legislation to deal with lapsed deadlines and
other problems, such as acid rain and the largely unregulated
hazardous air pollutants, but nothing has emerged. Stalemate is
often desirable for Congress because its members need not cast
controversial votes and can continue to blame EPA when constitu-
ents complain about pollution. New leadership in the White
House and the Senate may produce new clean air legislation, but
it will be interesting to see if any new legislation avoids the
seductiveness of delegation. Specifically, will Congress deal with
acid rain by promulgating its own emission limits-with or
without emissions trading5°-thereby replacing the baroque
delegations of the 1970 Act?
B. An Alternative Approach
47. This was documented in the administrative proceedings. See Joint Appendix at
2717-21, Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir 1980). cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1042 (1980).
48. See Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 774-75.
49. Id. at 770-71.
50. See Tripp & Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful Transferable Rights
Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REo. 369 (1989).
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Congress could have solved most of the air pollution problem,
as it was perceived in 1970, if it had enacted emission limits for
large boilers and the steel and chemical industries rather than
delegating to EPA the plenary power to regulate all manner of
sources."1 Legislative rules could create emission limits that would
be enforceable directly by citizen suits or government action. In
contrast, to control a pollutant under a National Ambient Air
Quality Standards requires multiple steps:
1. EPA must determine that the pollutant should be the
subject of a National Ambient Air Quality Standard;"
2. EPA must promulgate the standard;"
3. the state must adopt a plan containing emission
limits; 54
4. EPA must determine if the plan is adequate;55
5. if the state plan is disapproved, EPA must promulgate
a plan for the state. 8
Each of these steps takes at least one to two years; the entire
procedure often takes many years.
Since there are numerous harmful pollutants, states, revisions
of state plans, and requirements that pollutants also be regulated
under additional procedures of the Act, the delegation has
generated literally thousands of rulemaking proceedings. Each
requires the attention of teams of technicians, administrators, and
lawyers. There is significantly more delay and a much larger
commitment of resources when serious disputes arise. The system
is so complicated and uncertain that business and government
officials have trouble determining simply what pollution controls
apply in a given factory today, let alone those that will apply in
the future. In speaking of environmental law in general, James
Moorman, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund's first executive
director, said: "We erect an elaborate maze and defeat ourselves.
The result has raised the costs to industry to no reasonable
end."57
51. See Schoenbrod, supra note 11.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (1982).
53. Id. § 7409.
54. Id. § 7410.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Turner, supra note 43, at 34.
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Delegation certainly did not insulate environmental decision-
making from politics, as had been hoped. Instead, delegation
shifted decisionmaking from a highly visible political arena,
Congress, to less visible ones within federal agencies and state
governments. This decreased visibility benefitted industry since
the public is usually better able to influence the national legisla-
tive process than it is able to influence the agencies.58 The public
can get interested in whether Congress will vote for national
emission limits for power plants supported by environmentalists,
by industry, or by EPA. Such public interest means media
coverage and influence over the legislative process. But in giving
EPA the regulatory authority to establish limits, the operative
questions are determined in thousands of discrete proceedings
and are framed in highly technical terms. For instance, the
revision of an individual state's plan may concern only one of
many smoke stacks, at one of many power plants, and it may
turn on whether the state environmental agency fed the appropri-
ate weather data into the appropriate diffusion model." Almost
no one understands the issue or its significance, and everyone
finds it boring. Moreover, the fragmentation of decisionmaking
means that NRDC and its allies can fight only a fraction of the
relevant battles given their limited resources.
Delegation is not only a poor way of achieving substantive
environmental goals. Delegation also raises issues of principle as
to the process in which public interest environmental lawyers play
a part. The Act, unlike previous legal regimes, outlawed compro-
mising the protection of health. But even the authors of the
legislation knew that tragic choices were inevitable.6 Their failure
to face them helped to give us power. Moreover, we were willing
to tar government officials as violating the law for failing to
protect health when we knew that their supposed transgression
usually was a disagreement about an inevitable choice between
different degrees of risk to health.
The ultimate author of this demagogy was Congress. Demagogy
is the pursuit of power through riling passions and prejudices
against something. 6' Members of Congress struck a pose against
any harm to health without taking a stand for the steps necessary
58. See generaUy Elliot, Ackerman & Millian, supra note 15.
59. See Mission Indus. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123, 128 (1st Cir. 1976).
60. See Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 763 n.139.
61. WF.srit's TiR NEw IrERNArIONAL DICtIONARtY 598 (rev. ed. 1968).
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to protect health. Legislating rules would have required compro-
mises that would have exposed legislators to the public's displea-
sure. Some voters would blame Congress for leaving them
exposed to too much risk and others would have blamed Con-
gress for imposing excessive pollution control costs.
The Act, which we private attorneys general embraced, ulti-
mately proved less useful than we had hoped because it enabled
our elected representatives to escape accountability for difficult
decisions on pollution control. Delegation helps to explain why
ninety-eight percent of the congressional incumbents that run get
reelected. 62 Congress patronized the public by hiding the difficult
choices. The public still wants health protected, just as the statute
promises is possible. Congressional debate and enactment of
compromise emission controls would have developed a better
informed public that is more capable of resolving important
environmental political issues.
Conclusion
Our support for the legislators who professed environmental
convictions was reciprocated. They often honored the wishes of
public interest groups on questions of legislation, made sure that
we testified prominently at congressional hearings and were heard
by administrative agencies, and sometimes helped public interest
groups raise funds.
The dividing line between the public interest and the private
interests of public interest lawyers is not always clear. Just as
surely as public interest lawyers' power can be used for their
vision of the public good, power and prestige in themselves are
also private goods.
In retrospect, there is a huge difference between what I
thought public interest law would be and what it is. I had
envisioned it as a crusade for the public good in which private
interests, our own included, took a back seat." I had seen public
interest litigation and lobbying as a war against politics as usual.
From today's perspective, however, the distinction between the
tactics of mainstream public interest environmental litigation
groups and the lobbying arms of various industries is less clear.
Much of public interest environmental law today is lobbying,
62. See Wall St. J., July 19, 1988, at 28.
63. I remember the NRDC staff meeting in the mid-1970s when the misguided
majority, including myself, vehemently opposed raising any attorney's salary above $16,000.
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publicizing, and publishing-all desirable and essential parts of
politics as usual. Public interest environmental law has become
part of the system rather than an external force pressuring for
changes in the system itself.
There are some lessons to be gleaned from this experience.
First, efforts to achieve a noble goal by legislation that supposedly
circumvents politics will not succeed in removing that goal from
the entanglements of politics. Second, the legislation is likely to
change the political process in a way that obscures the issue,
thereby quite possibly doing more harm than good. Had Con-
gress not passed the 1970 Act, public desire for cleaner air would
have put pressure on Congress and its state counterparts to make
the hard choices. Third, there is a public interest in procedure
as well as in substantive goals. I wish that I had realized that
sooner.
368
Vol. 6: 357, 1989
